Minority Representation and Reserved Legislative Seats in Iraqi Kurdistan by Hassan Abdullah, Farhad & Hasan Hama, Hawre
Article 
1 University of Sulaimani, Tishk International University, Sulaymaniyah, Iraq.
Corresponding author:
Farhad Hassan Abdullah, Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR), College of 
Political Science, University of Sulaimani, Sulaymani 46001, Iraq/ Kurdistan.
E-mail: farhad.abdul@univsul.edu.iq
Contemporary Review 
of the Middle East 
7(4) 381–402, 2020 







and Reserved Legislative 
Seats in Iraqi Kurdistan
Farhad Hassan Abdullah1 and Hawre Hasan Hama1
Abstract
Ethnic and religious minorities have played a significant role in the long history of 
Kurdistan. At an official level, their political position was significantly strengthened 
with the advent of autonomy for the Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq in 1992. 
Most importantly, a quota system was established that reserved seats for several 
minority groups in the Kurdistan Parliament, often cited as an example of tolerance 
for diversity and respect for minority rights. Nevertheless, there is a lack of empirical 
research examining how ethnic and religious quotas affect democratic stability, 
quality of representation, and opportunities to represent authentic interests 
within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The politicians who occupy 
the reserved seats have come under criticism for merely supporting the policy 
programs of the dominant Kurdish parties, which deprives ethnic and religious 
minority groups of authentic representation and exposes the minority parties to 
allegations that they are politically exploited. This article analyzes the dynamics of 
minority political participation in Iraqi Kurdistan, how representation has been 
affected by the dominance of the ruling parties, and factors that guide the behavior 
of minority politicians while serving in quota-allocated positions. It also examines 
the effects of reserving seats through the quota system on the political behavior 
of minority groups. To these ends, this article focuses on parliamentary quotas and 
their impact on democratic stability, decision-making, and the empowerment of 
minority groups in the Kurdistan Region.
Keywords
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participation, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
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Introduction
Over 30 countries currently reserve legislative seats for minority groups (Htun, 
2004; King & Marian, 2012), whether based on race, nationality, religion, 
language, caste, age, or ability. According to MonaKrook and Zetterberg (2014), 
this method establishes a minimum level of group representation, providing 
stronger assurances of representation than similarly intentioned gender quotas. 
The main distinction between examples of minority-reserved seats is that they 
tend to have one of two goals. The first is “protection,” which involves providing 
seats to groups constituting a relatively small contingent within the population, 
including indigenous peoples, members of minority religions and nationalities, 
and caste-based groups. The object is almost always to compensate for past 
repression. The second goal is “power-sharing,” which involves distributing most 
or all seats in a legislature among different groups, as defined by ethnicity, 
religion, or language. The aim in these cases is to guarantee democratic stability 
in a divided society (Krook & O’Brien, 2010).
According to Muriaas and Wang (2012, p. 316), reserved minority seats or 
quotas are prone to be exploited by those in power, with several notable examples 
to be gleaned from African countries. For instance, an analysis of the 2006 election 
results in Uganda demonstrates that those who filled the reserved seats favored 
the ruling party at all levels of governance. Additionally, as a result of the reserved 
seat system, the incumbent National Resistance Movement Party received 3 
percent more seats in the legislature than would have been the case without the 
system. Other existing literature on minority-reserved seats has focused upon 
issues including: the relationship between reserved seats filled through competitive 
elections, political parties, and substantive minority representation (Zuber, 2015); 
the wider impact of electoral quotas (Krook & Zetterberg, 2014); and the validity 
of the claim to the protection and recognition offered by a reserved place. The 
political consequences of the broad allocation of reserved seats among many 
small ethnic minorities have also been examined (King & Marian, 2012). 
The minority-reserved seat system has been established in Iraqi Kurdistan for 
several minority groups since 1992. From the onset of the formal political process 
in the Kurdistan Region, ethnic and religious minorities have been internally 
divided over whether to engage with its political institutions and processes. When 
the idea was being debated in 1992, Christian communities in Kurdistan decided 
that they would be part of the Kurdish National Assembly and accept reserved 
seats. In contrast, the Turkmen parties initially rejected offers of reserved seats in 
the legislature under external pressure from Ankara, which did not wish to grant 
any legitimacy to the new Kurdish-dominated institutions in northern Iraq. While 
Turkmen participation in the political process began in 2009, this former attitude 
continues to influence the political behavior and decision-making of the Turkmen 
parties in the region.
Except for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the dominant parties 
in the region, the Kurdish parties tend to be critical of ethnic quotas. In 2008, the 
parliamentary bloc of the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the main rival of the 
KDP, proposed an increase in the number of minority-reserved seats from 5 to 11. 
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However, the reserved seats quickly became part of the KDP’s political agenda, 
partly because the majority of the minority populations are located within the 
KDP’s established geographic zone of influence in the Erbil and Duhok 
governorates, while the PUK had introduced a law for increasing minority seats in 
the Kurdistan Parliament in 2008 (Ziad Jabar Mohammed, personal communication, 
May 23, 2020). As a result, parties including the PUK, Kurdistan Islamic Group 
(KIG), Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), Change Movement (known as Gorran), 
and others have criticized the quota system in the Kurdistan Parliament as a 
built-in way for the KDP to exploit the system for its political interests.
Some critics have argued that some of the minority candidates for the legislature 
have been KDP members and have served in formal KDP structures. By placing 
their loyalists in the quota seats, these critics argue, the KDP gains an unfair 
advantage and can prevent legislative action by other parties. This has created 
distrust between the minority representatives and the majority of the political 
parties in the parliament. There have thus been several unsuccessful attempts to 
amend the quota system, despite general agreement that minority group rights and 
representation are important. This tension highlights a serious obstacle to authentic 
minority representation and exposes a serious flaw in the democratic process in 
the Kurdistan Region.
In contrast, the minorities in the Iraqi parliament have independent 
representation without being associated to any political party. The 329 seats in the 
Iraqi Council of Representatives are distributed across the country’s 18 provinces 
and allocated according to relative population. The capital Baghdad is given 69 
seats, Nineveh 31, Basra 25, Dhi Qar 19, Sulaimaniya 18, Babil 17, Erbil 15, 
Anbar 15, and Diyala 14. Kirkuk, Najaf, and Salahuddin have 12 seats each, and 
Dohuk, Diwaniya, Karbala, and Wasit have 11 each. The least populous provinces, 
Maysan and Muthanna, have 10 and 7 seats, respectively (Al-Dulaimi, 2018). 
Ethno-religious minorities in Iraq protect their representation by making up 3 
percent of all seats in the parliament, organized according to a quota system. In 
total, only nine seats are allocated to the ethno-religious minorities under the 
Electoral Law of 2018, which gives Christians five seats, including one each in 
the provinces of Baghdad, Dohuk, Nineveh, Erbil, and Kirkuk, and sets aside one 
seat each to the Yazidi, Shabak, Sabean, and Faili communities (Aziz, 2020).
In contrast, the total number of seats given to ethno-religious minorities in the 
Kurdistan Region is 11 out of a total of 111 seats. Because the electoral law of the 
Kurdistan region, which was issued in 1992, considers the region as a single 
constituency for the reserved seats, they are not specifically allocated to any of the 
region’s provinces. This has facilitated their exploitation by the dominant ruling 
party in order to advance the latter’s own political agenda. Most minority 
populations, mainly the Christians and Turkmens, live in the KDP-controlled 
zone in Erbil and Dohuk provinces. As a result, the KDP has close links to many 
ethno-minority candidates and works to support them during election campaigns 
and the voting process to ensure that the party in effect controls those 11 seats 
(Mamand, 2019). This has concerned not only the PUK and other opposition 
parties in the region but also the minority populations themselves, with some 
refusing to recognize the politicians elected to the reserved seats as authentic 
representatives of their communities.
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The main question this research seeks to answer is: How have the minority-
reserved seats been exploited by the ruling parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, specifically 
the KDP, for their political advantage? The article also explores the background to 
ethno-religious minorities’ political participation in the Kurdistan Region and 
discusses the main implications of the exploitation of minorities’ votes and 
representation of the democratic political process. Furthermore, the article 
highlights the possible means to achieve reform in the highly politicized minority 
representation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and presents the results of dozens 
of interviews conducted by the authors with members of both the Kurdistan and 
Iraqi parliaments.
Methodology
This research used qualitative elite interviews, which provide an adaptable 
technique ideal for answering the research questions. While preparing for these 
interviews, topics and subtopics for discussion were identified, rather than specific 
questions being formulated. During the interview process, specific questions 
would emerge during the exploration of these topics and subtopics. This gave the 
interviewer more freedom to explore the issues, rather than attempting to preempt 
them. The researchers decided not to interview voters from minority communities, 
partly because there is no separate minority voter register in the region, and it is 
not always easy to identify minority voters. Instead, we decided to focus on ethnic 
and religious minority and nonminority parliamentarians in both the Iraqi Council 
of Representatives and the Kurdistan Parliament, “elites” in the sense that they 
were party members, politicians, or officials of various minorities’ political parties 
who had access to decision-making processes. The participants were further 
selected based on their party affiliation and ethnic and religious identities.
Thirteen interviews were conducted with members of either parliament. The 
interviewees were chosen because of the importance of their roles within their 
parties and proximity to political power, and opposition and minority parties’ 
decision-making processes. Participants were asked to comment on: the process 
and justification of adopting the minority representation system in the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG); both the positive and negative effects of ethnic and 
religious quotas, including the influence on the democratic values and stability of 
the region, their party’s decision-making process, and its interethnic relations; and 
the causes of the violation of minorities’ representation and votes, and the steps 
that may be taken to release minorities from the trap of the dominant parties, 
particularly the KDP.
The following is the full list of interviewees with their political affiliations and 
positions. First, five minority politicians were chosen: Muna Kahveci, from the 
Turkmen Reform Party, has since 2018 been the second deputy speaker of the 
Kurdistan Parliament; Waheda Yako is a member of the Assyrian–Chaldean 
Syriac Bloc in the Kurdistan Parliament; Majid Osman is the chairman of the 
Erbil Turkmen Faction in the Kurdistan Parliament; Majid Osman is another 
Turkmen politician in Erbil; and Aydin Maruf is a member of the Politburo and 
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former member of parliament (MP) of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, head of the 
Kurdistan Turkmen Movement office, and Minister of State in the current KRG 
Council of Ministers.
The other seven interviewees were selected from the nonminority blocs, mainly 
of the Kurdistan Region’s ruling parties, the PUK and KDP, and opposition lists, 
particularly from the Islamist parties and the Change Movement. These parties 
have been in dispute over minorities’ political participation and the proportion of 
seats reserved for minorities in the Kurdistan Parliament. Rewaz Fayaq is a 
member of the PUK Leadership Council, and is also a current speaker of the 
Kurdistan Parliament; Abbas Fatah is a PUK lawmaker and the deputy head of the 
Committee of Legislation in the Kurdistan Parliament; Ziad Jabar Mohammed is 
a member of the PUK bloc and the head of the finance committee in the Kurdistan 
Parliament; Salar Mahmoud is a former PUK parliamentarian and is a current 
adviser of Iraqi President Barham Salih; Faxradin Qadir is a member of the KIG 
leadership council and the former general secretary of the Kurdistan Parliament; 
Abu Bakr Haladni is a member of the KIU and the KIU bloc in the Kurdistan 
Parliament; Latif Sheikh Mustafa is a legal expert and retired judge, and was an 
Iraqi MP for Gorran; Abdullah Mala Nuri is a prominent Gorran leader and former 
Gorran lawmaker in the Kurdistan Parliament; and Rabun Maroof is the former 
head of the New Generation Movement caucus in the Iraqi parliament and the 
current head of the Future Group in the Iraqi parliament. 
The interviews were conducted in December 2018 and January 2019. All 
respondents agreed to be recorded during their interviews and have their names 
mentioned in the resulting publications, including the present article. The entire 
interview process with each participant took between 30 minutes and 1 hour. The 
recordings were transcribed and directly quoted where appropriate. The research 
also draws on interviews with officials from the main minority parties that have 
been published in the Kurdish media.
Background: Minorities in the Kurdistan Region
In 1991, after a popular uprising known as the “Raparin Intifada” against the Iraqi 
regime under Saddam Hussein, the Kurdistan Region was established as an 
autonomous area under the supervision and protection of the international 
community. During a 15-day period, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces attempted to 
liberate all the areas claimed by the Kurdish population, including the city of 
Kirkuk and the surrounding region, but counterattacks led to Iraqi forces regaining 
areas in the north of the country, causing widespread displacement. This 
encouraged the international community, mainly the United States and European 
countries, to prevent a possible genocide.
At the European Community summit held on April 8, 1991, German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl told reporters that Iraq was “on its way to a genocide” (Rubin, 
2003). The United States and France declared a “no-fly zone” above the 36th 
parallel to guarantee the safety of the people living in northern Iraq (Ismael & 
Ismael, 2015), backed up by United Nations Security Council Resolution 688. 
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Some US officials were initially lukewarm to the idea of the creation of a safe 
zone, but only the Iraqi government strongly opposed the move. Iraq’s United 
Nations (UN) ambassador, Abdul Amir Anbari, declared that there was no need 
for the international community to impose a no-fly zone, since “the whole of Iraq 
is a safe haven to everyone” (Rubin, 2003). Safe from immediate reprisal, the 
PUK and KDP, which had until then been proscribed underground organizations, 
stepped into the political vacuum left by the absence of the forces of the Ba’athist 
regime. This provided the basis for de facto autonomy in the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq, and the establishment of semi-democratic, formal institutions there.
In the years that followed, Iraqi Kurds in the KRG have demonstrated that they 
can be responsible state builders, and have achieved greater levels of democracy, 
stability, and social reform than many other countries. By and large, ethnic and 
religious minorities were treated well once Kurdistan gained autonomy in 1991, 
and were represented in both KDP- and PUK-led governments (Gunter, 1996). 
Both parties stressed that they were “Kurdistani,” rather than “Kurdish”—that is, 
they claimed to propagate an inclusive political identity based on the geographic 
region, rather than one formulated exclusively around Kurdish ethnic 
nationalism—and the KRG developed a bill of rights that protects ethnic and 
religious minorities (Requejo & Badia, 2012).
Despite administrative shortcomings, a double siege on the region before 2003 
in the form of an internal siege by the Ba’athist regime, and the international 
embargo imposed by the UN on Iraq, Kurdistan’s political authorities decided to 
hold general elections. The main objective was to establish institutions to ensure the 
provision of public services and meet citizens’ basic needs. In May 1992, the various 
Kurdish parties held truly democratic elections, a rarity in the region. The KDP won 
45 percent of the votes, while the rival PUK took 44 percent (Gunter, 1996). There 
was a 7 percent threshold for parties to receive seats in the legislature according to 
Law No. 1 (1992) (An Act for the National Assembly of Kurdistan – Iraq) (Kurdistan 
Parliament, 1992), meaning only the KDP and PUK won seats. They agreed to 
divide the seats equally (Ghareeb & Dougherty, 2004), forming a united government 
based on equal power-sharing (van Wilgenburg & Fumerton, 2015).
The ethno-religious minorities also entered the parliament with reserved seats. 
The practice of seat reservation has long existed. The recognition and desire for 
some degree of descriptive representation is not new, nor is it a construct 
unencumbered by past misuse. In the mid-twentieth century, many colonially 
administered territories reserved seats for indigenous groups either as a transitional 
mechanism or, less subtly, as a sop to effectively keep them out of power (Handley 
& Grofman, 2008). It was in this manner that Kurdistan’s political parties and 
leaders formally included ethno-religious minorities in the region’s official 
political system. In the years after 1992, two distinct periods can be identified 
which involved differing representative experiences for minority groups.
The first period of representation for ethnic and religious minorities was rooted 
in the first parliamentary election of 1992. The major Kurdish parties had joined 
forces to establish what was known as the Kurdish Front, which agreed that the 
minorities should be represented. This was later formalized in an act for the 
National Assembly of Kurdistan, which read: “Each party, groups or minorities 
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such as Turkmen, Arabs, Assyrians and others have the opportunity to create their 
own electoral list” (Kurdistan Parliament, 1992). In practical terms, the law 
reserved five seats for the minorities in the parliament, in effect bypassing the 7 
percent threshold otherwise needed to obtain a seat (Kurdistan Parliament, 1992). 
Only the Christian political parties agreed to be part of the process, and after that 
election, the reserved seats were divided between the Assyrian Democratic 
Movement and Kurdistan Christian Unity according to the proportion of the votes 
won by those two parties.
Despite the sincere and enthusiastic efforts of the Kurdistan Front to persuade 
other ethnic groups to play a part in the region’s first democratic elections, things 
did not go according to plan. In the 1990s, parties representing Kurdistan’s Turkmen 
community decided to abstain from the process, primarily because of pressure from 
the Turkish government (Jüde, 2017). Turkey was extremely wary of the appearance 
of a Kurdish de facto autonomous region on its borders and explicitly opposed the 
Kurdish declaration of a federal state in Iraq (Petrosian, 2003).
Turkey was concerned that the KRG might serve as a pole of attraction for 
Turkey’s own restive Kurds, or that it might become emboldened enough to lend 
them direct support in their struggle against the Turkish state. Ultimately, the 
KRG could garner international sympathy for wider Kurdish national self-
determination, possibly leading to Turkey’s loss of territorial control in its 
majority-Kurdish southeastern region. Ankara has long feared that a fully 
independent and sovereign Kurdish state could emerge by design or accident, 
threatening not only Turkish territorial integrity but also an unraveling of the 
region’s political boundaries (Park, 2004). Throughout the 1990s, the Turkish 
government maintained a cordial relationship with Baghdad, which Ankara did 
not want to upset, given the importance of trade and cooperative efforts with Iraq 
to restrain the Kurdish militant group the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which 
operated on the Turkey–Iraq border. This somewhat mitigated the effects of the 
international embargo which had been placed on Iraq.
Table 1. Kurdish Parliamentary and Presidential Election Results, 1992
May 1992: Kurdistan National Assembly Election (105 Seats)
Party % Vote Seats
Kurdistan Democratic Party 45.3 51
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 43.8 49
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan 5.1 –
Kurdistan Socialist Party 2.6 –
Iraqi Communist Party 2.2 –
Kurdistan People’s Democratic Party 1.0 –
Independent Democrats Negligible –
Reserved for minorities (total) – 5
Assyrian Democratic Movement – 4
Kurdistan Christian Unity – 1
Source: Ghareeb and Dougherty (2004).
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The Turkish government cultivated its ties with Iraqi Turkmen communities 
regardless of their religious affiliations, supporting both Shia and Sunni Turkmen. 
The Turkish government believed that the Turkmen policy of general quiescence 
to Saddam Hussein’s regime had left them in bad stead with the larger and more 
militant Kurdish population. The US-enforced no-fly zone protected Kurds and 
allowed them to develop political and economic power, which they believed came 
largely at the expense of the Turkmen and Arab populations in the region (Cuthell, 
2007). For these reasons, Iraqi Turkmen decided not to engage in activities that 
might lend legitimacy to the KRG.
The Turkish state applied pressure on the Turkmen community in a variety of 
ways. Soon after the creation of the security zone, under the pretense of providing 
humanitarian aid to Iraqi Turkmen, Ankara opened the Red Crescent mission in 
Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region, which effectively served as a consulate. 
A 1998 Agence France Presse report noted that “[w]hile western specialists 
estimate their population at about 200,000–300,000, Turkmens in Iraqi” 
(Refworld, 2002), with the majority in Kirkuk, were outside the Kurdistan 
Region’s political borders. However, in an attempt to secure humanitarian aid 
from the Red Crescent, desperately needed in the early years of the KRG, many 
ethnic Kurds registered themselves as Turkmens, a move welcomed by the Turkish 
authorities, because it statistically increased the number of Turkmens living in the 
Kurdistan Region (Hassan, 2018). Additionally, a number of new Turkmen 
settlements appeared around Erbil (Petrosian, 2003). Despite the close relations 
between the countries, Iraq accused Turkey of encouraging the “Turkmenisation” 
of Erbil and the adjoining regions, and Arabic-language newspapers ran stories 
warning about Ankara’s influence over the Turkmen population. 
Immediately after the creation of the Kurdish security zone in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
however, two Turkmen parties, the Turkmen Brotherhood Association and the 
Iraqi National Turkmen Party (Iraq Milli Turkmen Partisi), were formed to 
advocate for the interests of the Turkmen population in Kurdistan. While not 
wanting to have them to give legitimacy to the KRG, Ankara encouraged the 
formation of these parties to increase its influence over the Turkmen community 
in Iraq. Under Turkish pressure, these parties, speaking for the Turkmen minority, 
refused to recognize the KRG’s draft constitution, mainly because of its 
identification of the Turkmen as a minority within the Kurdistan Region and the 
inclusion of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city disputed between the KRG and Baghdad, as 
part of the KRG’s territory. Turkey hoped that the Turkmens’ abstention from this 
decision, in particular, and the KRG’s political process, in general, would deny 
the new Kurdish entity legitimacy, making it appear ethnically exclusive, without 
the participation of one of its major minorities.
Beyond the Turkish government’s influence, the Turkmen parties had other 
reasons for not participating in the formal institutions of the KRG. Unlike the 
Assyrian–Chaldean Christians, Turkmens did not have representatives in the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Front, the umbrella organization of opposition parties in Kurdistan, 
before the 1991 uprising against the Iraqi government. Furthermore, they were 
concerned that if the parties participated in the elections, the Ba’athist regime 
would retaliate against the majority of Iraqi Turkmens who lived in areas 
controlled by Baghdad (Petrosian, 2003). 
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In the mid-1990s, the most influential Turkmen party became the Iraqi Turkmen 
Front, founded in 1995 when six Turkmen parties came together to form a 
coalition. Turkey actively encouraged Turkmen parties to join the Front, and, as a 
result, the KDP viewed it as a vehicle for Turkish interference in Kurdish affairs. 
The KDP’s newspaper Brayati stated in October 2002: “The so-called Turkmen 
Front group, which is acting as an emissary for Turkey, has damaged Turkey’s 
interests in this Region” (BBC, 2003). However, shortly before the collapse of 
Saddam’s regime, many Turkmen parties and political organizations were 
operating outside the Turkmen Front. In 2002, the Iraqi Turkmen Union Party 
(ITUP) was formed, maintaining neutrality between Turkish-sponsored and 
domestic Turkmen opposition groups. It also recognized the KRG as the legitimate 
authority in northern Iraq and rejected the establishment of an independent 
Turkmen militia (Strakes, 2009).
The ITUP leader Sayfaddin Damirci summarized the competing trends within 
Turkmen politics, stating,
The Turkmen parties have two approaches: one is to rely on the foreign factor [i.e., 
Turkish influence], and the second on the internal factor. Our party interacts with 
society [in the Kurdish Region]; our brothers rely upon the foreign factor. This situation 
prevents us from finding a united strategy. (Petrosian, 2003)
The Turkmen National Association was established at the beginning of November 
2002, encompassing several smaller Turkmen parties; it acted as a platform for 
the accommodation and integration of the Turkmen community into the structures 
of the KRG, in contrast to the abstentionist Turkmen Front (BBC, 2003).
During the first phase of Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, Christian parties 
became involved in the KRG’s institutions, but, by and large, Turkmen parties did 
not. During the second phase, political changes in the Kurdistan Region saw 
Turkmen parties become more involved in the politics of the KRG. Fighting 
between the dominant KDP and the PUK broke out in 1994 and continued until 
1998, leading to the division of the region into two separate administrations: that 
based in Erbil under the KDP and the Sulaymaniyah administration under the 
PUK. After September 1998, with the signing of the Washington Agreement to 
cease the fighting, the two parties took steps toward unifying the administrations.
While democratization had begun in the 1990s, there was a great deal of 
disunity between the major Kurdish parties; however, particularly in the years 
following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the parties were able to work together. 
Participating in two elections in 2005 with a unified list, the parties promised 
Kurdistan’s voters they would work to complete the process of unification after 
the elections. In that spirit, the Kurdistan Parliament amended the laws regarding 
minority representation to encourage all communities in Kurdistan to enter into 
political participation. In 2009, the Kurdistan Parliament issued Law No. 2 (2009) 
(An Act for the Fourth Amendment of the Kurdistan Region – Iraq Elections Law 
for the Kurdistan National Assembly), which increased the number of reserved 
seats for ethnic and religious minorities and introduced a quota mandating that at 
least 30 percent of MPs be women. Specifically, the parliament added five seats 
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for Turkmen parties and one seat for a representative of the Armenian community, 
in addition to the five already reserved for Christian parties (Kurdistan Parliament, 
2009). As part of this change, the Turkmen parties decided to become active in the 
formal political process. In large part, this was because the Turkmens no longer 
had to consider the threat of the Ba’athist regime and because relations between 
Erbil and Ankara had warmed over the previous years.
The push to increase the number of seats for ethnic and religious minorities 
came largely from the PUK during the third session of parliament in 2009 when 
the party occupied the position of deputy speaker of parliament. Nevertheless, the 
PUK has since become increasingly critical of the seat reservation system, because 
of what it argues is its exploitation by the KDP, an allegation explored later in this 
article. The practice of reserving seats has also caused anxiety among other 
religious minorities, especially almost 500,000 Yazidis in Iraq, because (Salloum, 
2013) they argue that it could undermine the principle of equality between 
religious groups. Yazidis have seen themselves as an ethnic minority in Iraq and 
even in KRI. For them, reserving seats in the parliament is as important as 
providing participation opportunities to other religious minorities, mainly the 
Christians. Other critics believe that it could lead to minorities’ political 
exploitation and thus create a negative social impression of the participation of 
ethnic minorities in the political process. As such, some voices have been raised 
advocating the elimination of the reserved seats.
Obstacles to the Real Representation of Minorities in 
Kurdistan 
Ethnic and religious minorities are represented at higher levels than elsewhere in 
Iraq Kurdistan in terms of legislative representation. Moreover, their property and 
land are protected by law in Article 4 and Article 5 of Law No. 5 (2015), which 
enshrines both positive and negative minority rights in the Kurdistan Region 
(Kurdistan Parliament, 2005). Nevertheless, it is important to examine how 
meaningful minorities’ political representation is in practical terms. Close analysis 
reveals several severe obstacles to the realization of authentic representation of 
minority interests.
First and foremost, the bulk of the ethnic and religious minority communities 
which have a presence in the Kurdistan Region live outside of the Kurdistan 
Region; those that do live within the region’s three governorates only total a few 
hundred thousand. As long as their numbers inside the region remain this small, 
they must rely on the quota system to ensure that they receive any representation 
in the legislature. They have agreed to such a structure because they operate from 
a relative weakness compared with the much larger ethnic Kurdish community; 
within the parliament, they must confront the overwhelming dominance of the 
main Kurdish parties. Their deputies do not directly compete with other candidates 
for their seats, and they only require a few hundred votes to become MPs. 
Therefore, they often have fragile public legitimacy compared to their counterparts 
in the mainstream Kurdish political parties, who win thousands, and in some cases 
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even over hundreds of thousands, of votes in the course of entering parliament 
(Rabun Maroof, personal communication, 18 December 2018).
This may create the impression among nonminority politicians and voters that 
the minority representatives often merely represent themselves, rather than any 
constituency. This can be seen in the attitude of some Kurdish MPs after the 
September 2018 parliamentary election, when they raised concerns about the 
legitimacy of the minority members and sitting alongside members who had only 
received a few hundred votes. Other opposition and PUK parliamentarians might 
have shared these sentiments, directly affecting the policies and attitudes of most 
of the Kurdish parties toward minorities’ political representation. If, in future, 
they form a parliamentary majority—for instance, the PUK in coalition with the 
smaller parties—they may take steps toward substantially reforming or ending the 
quota system for the region’s ethnic and religious minorities. Some minority 
parliamentarians may consent to this, should certain other conditions be met. The 
Turkmen Reform Party’s Muna Kahveci agreed in principle to the removal of the 
quota system if the territories disputed between Baghdad and Erbil could be 
decisively included in the Kurdistan Region, because most of the ethno-religious 
minority populations reside in these areas, and the minority vote would be 
substantially strengthened, doing away with part of the need for the quota (Muna 
Kahveci, personal communication, December 3, 2018).
Second, minorities have had negative experiences with the dominant Kurdish 
parties in the past, particularly during the 1990s. The KDP and the PUK have 
dominated politics in the Kurdistan Region; thus, minority communities have also 
been divided along these partisan lines to a certain degree. There is a geographical 
component, with minorities in the PUK-dominated Sulaymaniyah region tending 
to support that party, while their counterparts in Duhok and Erbil support the 
KDP. For instance, the Christian community in Koya has been under PUK 
influence, while the KDP has largely controlled the Turkmen, Christian (Assyrian–
Chaldean and Armenian), and Shabak communities further north and west. It 
cannot be expected that the parliamentary representatives of ethno-religious 
minorities in Erbil and Duhok will raise their voices against the KDP’s policies.
A clear example of this can be provided. On August 20, 2015, the presidential 
term of Masoud Barzani was officially supposed to expire, providing an 
opportunity for the Kurdistan Parliament to amend the presidency law so that the 
legislature would elect a new president. The PUK, Gorran, KIU, and KIG proposed 
plans to that effect; however, the KDP rejected all of them. The KDP’s decision 
used its influence over the minorities’ representatives to boycott the parliamentary 
sessions, preventing the passage of amendments to the presidency law (Rabun 
Maroof, personal communication, 18 December 2018). As a result, Barzani 
remained president for 2 more years without any legal basis (Hivaykurd, 2015). In 
May 2017, Gorran and the PUK signed a comprehensive political agreement 
which proposed several political reforms to the KRG as well as the two parties’ 
unification. They went so far as to create a leadership committee to meet with the 
other political parties and explain their agreement. The KDP immediately refused 
to recognize the agreement or receive the joint leadership committee, saying it 
would receive representatives of each party individually. Some Turkmen parties 
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welcomed the agreement and wished to receive the joint committee, but they 
canceled their meetings after being pressured to do so by the KDP (Abbas Fatah, 
personal communication, October 13, 2018).
This state of affairs does not only extend to the KDP and the minority 
representatives in the Kurdistan Parliament. The single Christian member of the 
Provincial Council of Sulaymaniyah is considered close to the bloc of the PUK, 
the dominant Kurdish party in the governorate. In 2013, a dispute arose between 
Gorran and the PUK over the position of Sulaymaniyah’s governor. Gorran, which 
at the time was the province’s largest party, felt that it should hold the position; 
however, the PUK prevented Gorran’s nominee from taking office and maneuvered 
the Provincial Council into electing a PUK candidate. During this dispute, the 
Christian representative sided with the PUK (Abubakr Haladny, personal 
communication, October 12, 2018). The father of the Christian representative was 
previously killed while serving in a PUK-affiliated Peshmerga unit and has a 
martyr’s status as a result (Abbas Fatah, personal communication, October 13, 
2018). Thus, the minority representatives have been influenced directly or 
indirectly by the policies of the dominant parties and cannot act independently of 
the party machines of the larger Kurdish parties, particularly the KDP (Rabun 
Maroof, personal communication, 18 December 2018).
Third, for the reserved minority seats, the electoral system treats the entire 
Kurdistan Region as a single voting district or constituency (BBC, 2013) and uses 
a closed list system (Katzman, 2009). In the 2005 and 2009 elections, there was a 
closed list in which each party published a list of candidates for each area. On 
polling day, the ballot paper simply listed the parties, with voters marking the 
party that they supported. In this system, a party receives seats roughly in 
proportion to its vote total, the MPs being chosen by the party. As a result, in two 
elections, voters casting ballots for the minority parties effectively did not know 
who their representatives would be. This was seen as beneficial to the minority 
parties but was not especially democratic.
Nor were the mainstream Kurdish parties much better off. In the 2005 
parliamentary election, the KDP selected two Yazidi candidates for the joint 
Kurdistani Bloc, in which PUK and KDP candidates ran on the same list. While 
both the Yazidi candidates won seats, they had no independence to go against the 
will of the dominant Kurdish parties, since they were part of the KDP’s party 
organization (Kurdistan Parliament, 2019). While this is an example of minority 
participation, it reinforced Kurdish party control over the minority communities. 
Even after the electoral system was changed to a semi-open system in which the 
voters select both a list and an individual candidate within a list, the KDP 
nominated some supposedly “independent” candidates for parliament who 
nevertheless came from within its organs and owed their seats to KDP support 
(Latif Sheikh Mustafa, personal communication, November 20, 2018). Therefore, 
the claim has been made that minority candidates have been representative of the 
dominant political parties rather than their own communities.
On a related note, the single-constituency electoral system has done political 
harm to Kurdistan since the 1990s. Some minority candidates can easily win 
seats, especially in the KDP-controlled areas, but others such as the Christians in 
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Koya and Turkmens in Kfri in the PUK-controlled zone have not won seats. This 
is because the bulk of minorities are located in the KDP zone, and the KDP can 
easily send its Peshmerga and Zeravani forces to vote for the minority candidates 
and secure seats for them in the parliament (Rewaz Fayaq, personal communication, 
November 12, 2018). Thus, the electoral system has been a significant obstacle to 
the proper representation of minorities in the political process; to end this 
misrepresentation, reform to the electoral system is necessary.
Fourth, many of the candidates nominated by the minority political parties 
have previous affiliations with the dominant Kurdish parties, especially the KDP. 
As mentioned earlier, the KDP nominated two Yazidis for the joint Kurdistani 
Bloc in 2005, who were members of the KDP. Before 2009, when Turkmen parties 
officially began running for reserved seats, four Turkmens had served in the 
parliament (Kurdistan Parliament, 2019). While they formally identified as 
political independents, all came from Erbil and were supported by the KDP; they 
were effectively KDP MPs, rather than true independents or representatives of 
Turkmen interests (Abbas Fatah, personal communication, October 13, 2018).
Moreover, the PUK’s Rewaz Fayaq told the authors that during the 2013–2018 
parliamentary session, one of the members of the Assyrian–Chaldean Syriac Bloc 
in the Kurdistan Region Parliament was a member of the KDP branch office “Leq 
(a KDP office in the town center)” in Duhok (Rewaz Fayaq, personal 
communication, November 12, 2018) while simultaneously occupying a reserved 
seat. Additionally, the KIG’s Faxradin Qadir told the authors that in the September 
2018 election, “2,500 Zeravani Peshmerga, affiliated to the KRG, voted for a 
Turkmen candidate” (Qadir Faxradin, personal communication, November 26, 
2018). In the same election, Gorran alleged that the KDP had engaged in fraud by 
telling “the commanders of Zeravani, the commander of the Halgurd Brigade, the 
commanders of the environmental police, and the traffic police in Soran town, to 
vote for the minority lists and candidates in the election” (KNN, 2018). Gorran 
also claimed that the KDP had influenced the order of the candidates on the 
minority lists so that its preferred candidates would be elected.
The Kurdish journalist Hemn Mamand in Erbil said that the Zeravani forces 
voted for the current Second Deputy Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament Muna 
Kahveci, who is from the Turkmen minority, after she visited the Zeravani 
headquarters in early March 2019 (Millet Press, 2019). All this significantly 
tightened the KDP’s grip on the parliament. Former Gorran MP Abdullah Mala 
Nuri stated that “Parliament is now the home of the KDP” (Abdullah Mala Nuri, 
personal communication, November 26, 2018), and Ismael Namiq, head of 
Gorran’s legal department, has stated that democracy is under threat in Kurdistan, 
citing the fact that the KDP controls the Speaker’s office, in addition to possessing 
45 seats (Millet Press, 2019b). Both these criticisms refer to the fact that Speaker 
Vala Fared is a member of the KDP, as is First Deputy Speaker Hemin Hawrami 
(Rudaw, 2019).
One of the most important committees in the parliament is the legal committee; 
according to the parliamentary procedure, each bloc with at least five seats has the 
right to have one member in the committee. Following the 2018 election, the KDP 
was able to prevent the Kurdistan Islamic Union from having a member in the 
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committee, instead allocating the seat to a Turkmen MP (Hawlati, 2019). This also 
effectively raises the question of whether this Turkmen MP, and the minority 
representatives, more generally, can operate with an independent voice.
Fifth, the bulk of the minorities in Iraq are located in the provinces of Kirkuk, 
Salah Al-Din, and Nineveh, and in Diyala, an area disputed between the KRG and 
the Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad. Without the return of the disputed areas 
to KRG control, the size of the ethnic and religious minorities in the Kurdistan 
Region will remain proportionally much smaller than the number of reserved seats 
in the parliament. During the interviews, the authors found that the minorities’ 
representatives believed that their seats are just an act of charity to them, which has 
affected their role and position in the political process. Kahveci told the authors 
that “one of the obstacles to minorities’ having real representation in Parliament is 
the existence of the disputed territories outside the KRG’s control.” She insisted 
that if those areas formally became part of the KRG, the minority communities 
would have no further need for the quota system and would support its abolition 
(Muna Kahveci, personal communication, December 3, 2018).
This is important, since no political party in the Kurdistan Region has thrived 
without a geographic stronghold. Without the numerical power of their followers 
in the disputed territories,1 the minority parties have been unable to exert 
significant pressure upon the authorities through public mobilization. Remaining 
as a marginal, dominated caucus in the parliament without a significant 
constituency behind them has hindered the true development of the minority 
political parties.
Sixth, some minority representatives have been influenced by external and 
regional powers’ agendas, especially Turkey (Rewaz Fayaq, personal 
communication, November 12, 2018). According to some Turkmen MPs, there is 
clear Turkish intervention in Turkmen affairs in the Kurdistan Region, mostly for 
its interests, continuing today, as well as historically, as discussed earlier (Majid 
Osman, 2018). While the dominant political parties have marginalized minority 
communities in the region for many years, if they ask for support from external 
powers to advance their interests, they are accused of disloyalty. This affects 
minorities’ attitudes toward Kurdish political developments. For instance, the 
Turkmen Front in Kirkuk and Erbil did not support the 2017 independence 
referendum (Tastekin, 2017) and called for the cancellation of the result 
(Hivaykurd, 2017). The Turkish government often justifies its interventions in the 
Kurdistan Region on the pretext of protecting minorities (Cuthell, 2007).
Furthermore, Iraq’s Turkmen community has largely supported Turkey’s 
“Operation Olive Branch” in Syria’s northern Afrin district, taken against the 
autonomous Kurdish area that has emerged in the district. “Iraq’s Turkmen, as 
always, stand with the Turkish Republic [...] we are well aware that this operation 
targets terrorist organizations in Afrin and not local residents or our Kurdish 
brothers,” Iraqi Turkmen Front lawmaker Aydin Maruf has stated (Baghdad Post, 
2018). These comments caused outrage in the Kurdistan Region, with some 
activists filing lawsuits against him and calling for his removal from office. 
Therefore, regional powers’ support for some ethnic minorities in the region has 
increased pressure on their representatives, affecting their participation and 
representation in the political process. 
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Seventh, not all the minority communities vote for minority party lists, instead 
preferring to support one Kurdish party or another. According to Turkmen MPs, 
few Turkmen voters vote for Turkmen candidates to the Kurdistan Parliament, 
because there are also Turkmens within the KDP, the PUK, Gorran, and the 
Islamic parties whose views they prefer (Aydin Maruf, personal communication, 
December 16, 2018). Moreover, the perception exists among many voters that the 
minority representatives do not work for their communities but stand for election 
only to advance their self-interests. Turkmen MP Majid Osman believes that
over 80 percent of individuals who have nominated themselves to be minorities’ 
representatives are not qualified and are inexperienced, which means they do not 
get even their own votes without other [other political parties, mainly KDP] support, 
and that they work for their interests. As a result, the minorities are angry at their 
representatives, and a huge gap has grown between them. (Majid Osman, personal 
communication, December 10, 2018)
As this indicates, many minority voters have a somewhat sophisticated 
understanding of who can deliver benefits to their community.
Implications of the Quota System
In some ways, the quota system has provided a chance for greater integration of 
the ethno-religious minorities of the Kurdistan Region. It would be inaccurate to 
say that minorities are entirely marginalized or have no representation at all in the 
legislative process. Nevertheless, the quota system has many undesirable 
implications for the policy process in the Kurdistan Region for minority 
communities. 
First may be listed the exploitation of minority participation in the Kurdistan 
Region. As mentioned earlier, minority voters are exploited by the dominant 
Kurdish parties and their representatives who have the support of, and, in critical 
instances, are voted to support, the KDP. One instance among many is the earlier-
described example of when, in August 2015, 10 minority representatives in Erbil 
and Dohuk were key to Barzani’s illegal extension of his presidential term until 
2017. Moreover, during the government formation process after the 2018 election, 
the KDP claimed to possess 56 seats in the parliament, indicating that it considers 
that it controls the 11 minority-reserved seats in addition to the 45 seats won by its 
candidates, according to KDP member Hoshyar Zebari (Zebari, 2019). On March 
28, 2019, the combined 68 MPs of the KDP, the minority parties, and Gorran 
introduced a draft law, “Proposal to Activate the Presidency of the Kurdistan 
Region - Iraq and Amend the Method of Electing the President until the Ratification 
of the Constitution,” to the Kurdistan Parliament (Rudaw, 2019), without the 
support of the PUK, KIG, KIU, and the New Generation Movement.
A recent case of the exploitation of minority representation by the KDP 
involved a parliamentary vote on lifting immunity from an opposition MP. On 
May 7, 2020, the Kurdistan Parliament voted to lift the immunity of the KIG 
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member Soran Omar Saeed after he directed an allegation of corruption charges 
against the head of the KRG, Masrour Barzani. To achieve this, the KDP relied on 
the support from the 11 minority representatives, as well as the 45 members of the 
KDP, and one deputy from the Kurdistan Socialist Party. Only with the participation 
of the minority representatives could the vote proceed as quorate, as 53 MPs from 
all the other blocs, including the PUK, Gorran, KIU, KIG, the New Generation 
Movement, and independents, boycotted the session. This abuse of power is 
revealed even more clearly when it is considered that the 11 minority MPs had 
received 23,165 votes (IHERC, 2020), whereas Saeed alone had received 42,459 
votes. Through using the 11 minority MPs, the KDP demonstrated it could pass 
any law it desired, or punish anyone speaking out against its corruption and 
mismanagement, and marginalize the other parties, particularly the PUK (Aydin 
Maruf, personal communication, December 16, 2018). The minorities are a 
fundamental part of the KDP’s political strategy and have been used to advance 
its agenda.
Second, the quota system in Iraqi Kurdistan is necessarily selective about 
which ethnic and religious minority groups it gives seats to, specifically Christians 
(Assyrian and Chaldean) and Turkmens. Other groups such as the Yazidis, Kaka’I, 
and Sabaean–Mandaeans are excluded and are not provided with any reserved 
representation. Some of these groups are Kurdish-speaking, but they may consider 
themselves to be religiously and/or ethnically distinct from most Kurds. The 
Yazidis have become increasingly critical of the KRG after the failure of the 
Peshmerga to protect Sinjar from attack by the Islamic State terrorist group in 
2014, since, at that time, the KDP’s forces were responsible for protecting the area 
(Reuters, 2014). In contrast to the situation existing in the Kurdistan Parliament, 
the Yazidis have benefited from the quota seats in the Iraqi Council of 
Representatives in Baghdad. According to the PUK’s Rewaz Fayaq, the KDP 
attempted to allocate some seats for the Yazidis in 2013, but the other political 
parties were not supportive because they believed that the KDP would once again 
abuse these seats to serve its own interests.
Third, quotas arguably go against the principle of equality that is enshrined in 
the Iraqi Constitution. In the Kurdistan Region, the number of reserved seats in 
the parliament exceeds the relative numbers of minorities in the general population. 
During the September 2018 election, the Independent High Elections and 
Referendum Commission found that minority parties were able to secure 11 seats 
with only 14,657 votes. The religious minority of Assyrian–Chaldean Christians 
received five seats on the strength of 7,213 votes, the Turkmen ethnic minority 
won five seats with 6,829 votes, and the Armenian community’s one reserved seat 
was decided based on just 615 votes cast in total, with the winning candidate 
receiving 346 votes (Rudaw, 2018). In contrast, the KIU was allocated five seats 
after receiving 30,659 votes, the KIG was allocated seven seats after winning 
83,090 votes, and the New Generation Movement was allocated eight seats after 
winning 115,726 votes. Together, the minority parties have only one seat fewer 
than the third strongest political party in the parliament, Gorran. In the 2018 
election, Gorran was allocated 12 seats after winning 136,350 votes, nearly 10 
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times the number of voters who participated in the semi-open list system for 
minorities (Rudaw, 2018).
Solutions and Conclusion
Minority-reserved seats have been exploited by the major parties of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, especially the KDP, for their political advantage, and at the cost of 
democratic process in the region. At first glance, the political participation of 
minorities since 1992 seems to have been motivated by the incentive of power-
sharing; however, continuing discrimination against these groups and exploitation 
of their participation and representation by the dominant groups in the political 
process have been concerns for many. This is shown in the KDP’s interference in 
minorities’ political participation and representation, especially in nominating 
candidates on behalf of minorities and imposing its own minority community 
party members on the minority parties to secure a stronger position in the 
legislature. Our research concludes that the exploitation of minorities’ 
representation and participation by the Kurdish dominant political parties, 
specifically in Erbil and Duhok, has affected democracy in the region and had 
several implications for the polity. The article finds several obstacles to the real 
representation of minorities in the parliament, resulting from legal, political, and 
even external factors.
Based on the results of the interviews, several scenarios may be presented to 
develop prospects for the real representation and participation of minorities. 
While reserving seats for ethnic and religious minorities was initially necessary to 
ensure the participation of those communities in the political institutions of the 
KRG, in the intervening years, there have been several impediments that have 
undermined the ability of minority representatives to play a substantive role in the 
political process. To that end, several ways have been suggested to improve 
minority representation, several of which were mentioned by MPs interviewed by 
the authors. These include the following solutions.
Separate minority voter registers: Establishing separate registers for minorities 
and Kurds would make it more difficult for the Kurdish parties, in general, and for 
the KDP, in particular, to have their members and supporters tactically vote for 
minority parties. Special voting centers with local and international observers 
could be established for election day to cater to minority voters (Aydin Maruf, 
personal communication, December 16, 2018). New Zealand’s system of 
guaranteed Maori representation in the parliament may serve as a practical 
example here. For many years, Maori candidates were placed on separate voter 
registers and voted for in four exclusively Maori districts. However, this raised 
the problem of whether particular individuals should be placed on Maori or 
general voter registers, and the additional issue that many Maoris preferred not to 
be singled out for this special treatment. To alleviate these problems, it was 
decided that the special Maori seats would be retained but registration on the 
Maori register would be optional (Lijphart, 2007).
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Creation of national parties: With the creation of truly national parties that do 
not have a political program based on Kurdish ethnic nationalism, these parties 
would operate based on civic values and citizenship, rather than ethnic and 
religious identities, and be open to all groups and communities in the region 
(Aydin Maruf, personal communication, December 16, 2018). Apart from this, 
there might still be quotas for minorities, but this would be an intraparty matter, 
similar to the establishment of quotas for women on party lists (Latif Sheikh 
Mustafa, personal communication, November 20, 2018). While this could pose a 
danger that minority communities’ interests might still be ignored by majority 
group party members, parties would have more of an incentive to compete for 
minority votes and, therefore, pay attention to their interests.
Reduction in the number of reserved seats: Some have argued that positive 
discrimination is necessary in the early stages of developing a democratic political 
culture, and also that the number of reserved seats should be more in proportion 
to the actual population of minority communities in the Kurdistan Region. 
Reducing the reserved seats from 11 to 5 would bring the number more in line 
with the demographics of the region. Moreover, the seats could be reorganized 
and redistributed among all ethnic and religious minorities, including those who 
have been marginalized for decades, said Abbas Fatah, an MP in the Kurdistan 
Parliament (Abbas Fatah, personal communication, October 13, 2018). 
Counterintuitively, reducing the number of reserved seats could lead to stronger 
representation on behalf of the minority communities, as their representatives 
would be less subjected to the dominant parties’ pressure, as detailed earlier.
Change in electoral law to establish multiple electoral constituencies: 
According to some MPs from Kurdish political parties, the quota system has 
created a huge change in the political balance in the Kurdistan Region since 2005, 
requiring a change to the electoral law. Fayaq informed the authors that the PUK 
might create a list for Christians in Koya and Turkmen in Kfri and win several 
seats by ensuring these candidates receive 4,000–5,000 votes (Rewaz Fayaq, 
personal communication, November 12, 2018). However, doing so might merely 
change which Kurdish party is best able to tactically exploit minority seats, rather 
than ensuring authentic representation of minority interests (Abubakr Haladny, 
personal communication, October 12, 2018).
Creation of advisory councils for minority groups: In the recently emerged 
democracies in Eastern Europe, a number of models have emerged that address 
these countries’ diverse populations. Romania, Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia have 
all created special councils for minorities in their parliaments. These advisory 
bodies were established to influence legislation and monitor its implementation 
for minority groups. While there are clear cultural and social differences between 
the Kurdistan Region and Eastern European countries, such a model based on 
democratic principles could be adapted, with modifications, to ensure adequate 
minority representation within Kurdistan’s legislative and executive bodies. For 
instance, a council for ethnic minorities could be established to represent 
Turkmens, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Armenians, and a council for 
religious minorities to represent Yezidis, Christians, Kaka’is, Zoroastrians, 
Sabaean–Mandaeans, and Baha’is.
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Creation of the “West Lothian” solution: Under this option, minority 
representatives would be restricted to voting only on those matters related to 
minority rights. In other words, they would have a specific mandate and would 
not be exploited by other parties on a routine basis (Rewaz Fayaq, personal 
communication, November 12, 2018). This may be considered as a not-fully-
democratic approach to deal with minorities but is nonetheless a possible scenario 
to prevent the exploitation of minorities’ votes and representation. The minorities’ 
deputies must provide representation for their own ethnic and religious 
communities but would not have the right to vote for certain bills and legislatures 
that would not have a direct impact on these communities.
Creation of a civil constitution outlining the rights and duties of all groups 
and addressing minorities’ rights on the principle of citizenship: Ensuring that 
minority groups are treated in accordance with international law will help protect 
their rights and give their representatives the genuine opportunity to work for 
their communities (Salar Mahmoud, personal communication, December 18, 
2018). The misuse of political representation, and the threatening of minorities to 
adopt a dominant party’s agenda, can be considered as a breach of a state’s 
international obligations that affirm universal commitment to ensuring minorities’ 
rights in the region.
Reform of the Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission in the 
Kurdistan Region: Salar Mahmoud, a former Kurdistan MP and current advisor to 
the Iraqi President Barham Ahmed Salih, stated that the commission’s partisan 
composition hinders the impartial application of electoral decisions. He said that 
he participated in the writing of the region’s electoral law but did not vote for it 
because of its flaws (Salar Mahmoud, personal communication, December 18, 
2018). Therefore, establishing a genuinely impartial electoral commission may 
prevent fraud and abuse of the minority list system.
Increase in minority representation in the government and legislative 
leadership: This could include giving minority representatives positions such as 
deputy president, deputy prime minister, and deputy speaker of parliament 
(Waheda Yako, personal communication, December 23, 2018). This could 
eliminate the psychological sensation of marginalization and provide a greater 
chance to minority representatives to play a real and independent role. To 
demonstrate their goodwill and commitment to the democratic rights of minorities, 
the ruling parties have regularly appointed members of ethnic and religious 
minorities to ministerial positions without portfolio, but this was done for 
symbolic reasons, without taking into account the individual ministers’ 
professional competence or leadership qualities (MERI, 2015). The KRG’s 
cabinets have so far failed to assign any specific ministerial positions to minority 
representatives. Faxradin Qadir told the authors that merely increasing minorities’ 
presence in the political process, without assigning their representatives any 
power or responsibility, has no impact. It has the same effect as assigning those 
positions to KDP MPs or ministers.
Implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution and incorporating the 
disputed areas into the Kurdistan Region: This would incorporate more ethnic 
and religious minorities into the region, increasing the proportion of their 
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population relative to the Kurdish majority. This would provide minority MPs 
with more respect and influence, and may ultimately render the reserved seats 
unnecessary as more minority representatives become elected to the general body 
of parliamentarians.
In sum, perhaps amending the electoral law to establish multiple electoral 
constituencies and separate minority voter registers will be an ideal solution to 
prevent misuse and exploitation of the minorities’ representation in the Kurdistan 
Parliament by the KDP. The number of reserved seats for minorities in the 
Kurdistan Parliament should be changed to one that would not be a case for 
changing the balance in the parliament in favor of the KDP. Reducing the number 
of minority quota seats will prevent any further misuse of minority representation 
by the ruling party.
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Note
1. Iraq’s constitution contains the term “disputed territories” but does not define it. 
Likewise, media reporting on the disputed areas tend to describe an undifferentiated 
300-mile-long swath of territory from the Iranian to the Syrian border, with oil-rich 
Kirkuk at its center. Iraqi actors themselves often mythologize the contested land, with 
the Kurds describing Kirkuk, the geographic and strategic epicenter of the dispute, as 
“our Jerusalem.”
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